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Abstract 
This study aims to quantitatively evaluate the rice policy reforms in Japan since 1995. First, I review the development 
of the Japanese rice policy reforms since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the transition of the 
representative indices that measure the level of agricultural protection, such as the producer support estimate (PSE) 
and the aggregate measure of support (AMS). Next, a quantitative evaluation of the volume of transfers facilitated by 
the rice policies is carried out by employing the standard framework of welfare analysis. The changes in social welfare 
are simulated when the ex ante and ex post policies related to rice, namely, direct payment per output, purchase of rice 
by the government, and acreage control, are abolished and when the import tariff on rice is abolished. In addition, I 
calculate the average transfer efficiency (ATE) of the rice policies during the analysis period and draw the surplus 
transformation curve (STC) along with the changes in the acreage control rate. It is concluded that acreage control is 
the most important policy instrument in the current rice policy mix however, it is highly inefficient and imposes a 
serious burden on consumers and government expenditure.
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     1. Introduction 
 
This study aims to quantitatively evaluate the rice policy reforms in Japan since the 
enforcement of the Staple Food Law in 1995. Rice is the most important crop, accounting for 
approximately 25% of the Japanese agricultural production. Meanwhile, the rice policy 
reforms introduced in conformance with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture are functional, 
starting from the revision of the Staple Food Law in 1995 to the newly introduced “Programs of 
Direct Payment for Paddy-Field Farming” in 2007. In developed countries, the reduction in 
domestic support is one of the three “pillars” in the current Doha Round negotiations. 
Moreover, in the trade liberalization process of farm products, it is important to monitor 
developed countries such as Japan, which have a high agricultural protection level. In addition, 
as pointed out by Hart and Beghin (2006), the method of reducing the aggregate measure of 
support (AMS) by the Japanese government takes advantage of the loophole in the current 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore, the study of the Japanese rice policy reforms, 
which were introduced to ensure that the policies conformed to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, provides an insight into the formulation of desirable domestic support rules. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of the Japanese rice policy that was prevalent before the 
introduction of the Programs of Direct Payment for Paddy-Field Farming in 2007 offers 
significant insight into the domestic agricultural policy reforms. For example, the acreage 
control policy, designed to reduce the produced quantity and maintain the price of rice, is being 
criticized for its inefficiency and farmers’ unwillingness to participate in the program. While 
some insist on abolishing acreage control and reinforcing the use of abundant rice for feed 
(Suzuki and Kaiser, 1998), others insist on providing increased direct payment to principal 
farmers (Yamashita, 2006). However, before discussing such alternative policies, it is 
necessary to evaluate the effect of the rice policies on producers, consumers, and tax payers 
since the enforcement of the Staple Food law. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the development of the Japanese rice policy 
reforms since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture is reviewed. The transition of the 
representative indices that measure the level of agricultural protection, namely, the producer 
support estimate (PSE) measured by the organization for economic cooperation and 
development (OECD) and the AMS notified by the Japanese government is also reviewed. In 
Section 3, a quantitative evaluation of the volume of transfers facilitated by the rice policies is 
carried out by employing the standard framework of welfare analysis applied by Otsuka and 
Hayami (1985) and Godo (2002). In order to evaluate the effect of domestic policies, the 
changes in social welfare are simulated when the ex ante and ex post policies related to rice, 
namely, direct payment per output, purchase of rice by the government, and acreage control, 
are abolished In addition, I calculate the average transfer efficiency (ATE) of the rice policies 
and draw the surplus transformation curve (STC) along with the changes in the acreage control 
rate, both of which are argued by Gardner (1983). Finally, the findings and the policy 
implications of this study are discussed. 
 
2. Rice Policy Reforms since 1995 
 
2.1 Rice Policy under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
In this section, I explain the rice policy reforms from 1995 to 2006
1. 
[Table 1] 
Before the enforcement of the Staple Food Law in 1995, the Japanese rice marketing system 
was based on the Food Control Law, which was enacted in 1942 and which originally placed all 
                                                  
1 See also Hayami (1988) and Hayami and Godo (1997) for the rice policy under the Food Control System. food items under strict government control. Although the food control system for all crops, 
except rice, was abolished, the government system for controlling the distribution of the entire 
quantity of rice was effective until 1995. This system had become a dead letter in the 1990s; the 
illegal “free-market rice,” which is outside the purview of the orderly marketing system, 
became prevalent, and the government expenditure to support the price of rice by buying and 
disposing rice was considerable. The year 1993 was a turning point with respect to rice policies 
in Japan in that the harvest was exceptionally poor, producing only 74% of the average harvest, 
and the government was forced to urgently import 2.6 million tons of rice. Furthermore, the 
Uruguay Round negotiations reached an agreement at the end of 1993, and the government was 
required to revise the Food Control Law in order to import rice under the minimum access 
commitment. By exempting rice from tariffication, the Japanese government was imposed 
greater rice imports with minimum access commitment; the minimum access import quota was 
4% of the domestic consumption in 1995 and to be increased gradually up to 8% in 2000, while 
the quota was 3% and 5% respectively if the tariffication had been implemented. 
Finally, the Food Control Law was replaced by the Staple Food Law (the Law for 
Stabilization of Supply-Demand and Price of Staple Food) in 1995, which came into effect on 
November 1, 1995
2. The compulsory system of selling rice to the government was abolished, 
and the role of the government purchase was limited to maintaining a rotating stock of rice. In 
addition, the free-market rice was legalized as “nonorderly marketed rice.” Rice import with 
minimum access also began in 1995, with an import of 426,000 tons, which was 4% of the 
domestic consumption. The import quota was controlled by the Food Agency, the state trading 
enterprise (STE) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of Japan. 
However, even after the implementation of the Staple Food Law, the government continued to 
support the price of rice by purchasing large amounts of rice. The stock of rice purchased by the 
government amounted to over 3 million tons, partly because of the good harvest from 1994 to 
1997. In order to deal with these problems, the New Rice Policies was introduced in 1998. First, 
acreage control for curbing rice production was reinforced in order to reduce the government 
stock and maintain the price of rice. Second, as a substitute to the conventional subsidy for 
voluntarily marketed rice, the Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program (JRIS) 
compensated for the decrease in the price of voluntarily marketed rice from the average price 
for three years. As a part of this program, eligible producers had to participate in the acreage 
control program. Third, the liberalization of distribution system, such as the abolishment of 
market price control for orderly marketed rice, was implemented. 
The Staple Food Law was once again revised in 1999 to tarifficate rice imports. The import 
quota was converted to the tariff rate quota, while the official control of quota was maintained. 
The out-of-quota tariff rate of rice was set at 341 yen per kg, which virtually prohibited all rice 
imports except for the minimum access imports. The volume of the minimum access rice 
imports was thereby reduced from 8% to 7.6% of the total consumption in 2000. 
Subsequently, the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas was established in 1999, 
and the Basic Plan in 2000 announced agricultural policies that were more market-oriented and 
changed the conventional price support for all farmers to income support for principal farmers. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the Principle and Outline of Rice Policy Reform in 2002, the 
Staple Food Law was revised in 2004. This revision completely liberalized the orderly 
marketing system and regulated the government purchase of rice through the bidding system. 
In addition, the Income Stabilization Program for Principal Farmers, which produced 
additional payments for principal rice farmers with large farms, was introduced along with the 
                                                  
2 In the Japanese rice system, the rice year begins from November in the previous year and ends in October 
in the subsequent year. Therefore, the Staple Food Law came into effect in the 1996 rice year. Note that the 
rice available in the market in the 1996 rice year was mainly produced in the 1995 rice year. conventional JRIS. In 2007, a new income stabilization program called the Programs of Direct 
Payment for Paddy-Field Farming was introduced, but the measures of income stabilization are 
the same as the conventional rice policies. 
The key statistics of the rice economy in Japan in this period are summarized in Table 1. The 
considerable decline of rice price, i.e., from 285 yen per kg in 1995 to 216 yen in 2006, is 
observed. Accordingly, the quantity of rice produced decreased from 10.72 billion tons in 1995 
to 8.55 billion tons in 2006. The amount of payment per output is the average of subsidy for 
total production, including the free market rice that is not covered by direct payment programs. 
The declining amount of subsidy indicates both the reduction in the government expenditure 
for the program and the decrease of the former orderly marketed rice. Instead of providing 
more direct payment, the government made efforts to maintain the price of rice by raising the 
acreage control rate and providing more subsidies for acreage control. In 2006, only 70% of the 
paddy field was cultivated for rice production, and the remaining 30% of the land was used for 
the production of diverted crops, such as wheat and soybeans, or in land improvement 
programs. The stock of domestic rice has been significantly reduced since the enforcement of 
the New Rice Policies in 1998. In contrast, the stock of imported rice was been accumulated up 
to 1,890 thousand tons in 2006. Most of the minimum access rice imports were sold for 
non-edible use, such as feed, processing use and food aid. The government’s ability to purchase 
and dispose domestic rice is considered to be limited by the stock of imported rice and the 
financial burden of disposing the stock.  
 
2.2 Rice Policy Reforms and Agricultural Protection Rate 
Next, the influence of the rice policy reforms on the indices for the level of agricultural 




Table 2 summarizes the trend of PSE in Japanese agriculture since 1986 and the PSE related 
to rice. Some payments, such as the payment for the diversion program and the direct payment 
for principal farmers, are reported as being unrelated to rice, but are still included in Table 2 
because they are apparently related to rice production. 
The total PSE measured by the farm gate price decreased by more than 40% from 7,726 
billion yen in 1986 to 4,149 billion yen in 2007. The percentage PSE also decreased from 65% 
in 1986 to 46% in 2007. There are three types of PSE that are related to rice: (A) supports based 
on commodity outputs, (C) payments for which production is required, and (E) payments for 
which production is not required. The total amount of the PSE related to rice almost halved 
from 3,386 billion yen to 1,558 billion yen. This shows that the agricultural policy reforms in 
Japan resulted in a reduction in the agricultural protection rate. 
[Table 3] 
Table 3 shows the trend of AMS till 2006 and the overall trade-distorting domestic support 
(OTDS), that is, the sum of the authorized AMS, de minimis, and Blue Box expenditure, which 
will become a basis for domestic support reduction. 
The total AMS decreased more drastically than PSE, especially since 1998, because the 
official “administered price” for rice became unreported and the market price support for rice 
became zero. This reflects the liberalization of the marketing regulation of rice after the 
implementation of the New Rice Policies. However, the sudden reduction in the market price 
support for rice in 1998 does not imply that there was a significant decrease in the farmers’ 
income. The liberalization process was functional before 1995 and was completed under the 
                                                  
3 See also Godo and Takahashi (2008) for the notification of domestic agricultural policies by the Japanese 
government. revised Staple Food Law in 2004. Furthermore, the price support of rice through the acreage 
control program and the intervention of rice market by the government purchase and sale of 
stock are still in effect. Therefore, the official announcement of Japanese MAFF in the 
notification documents is a little misleading. Since 1998, the AMS related to rice has been zero, 
and the OTDS related to rice, including JRIS and other income stabilization programs, only 
constitutes approximately 10% of the total OTDS. Another problem in the notification of the 
domestic policy by the Japanese government is that the payments for acreage control are 
included in the Green Box. Acreage control stimulates the production of diverted crops such as 
wheat and soybeans; however, the government explains it as “payments for maintaining paddy 
fields in an environmentally good condition.” The rice policy reforms are successful in that 
they reduced the amount of AMS significantly. 
 
3. Quantitative Evaluation of the Rice Policy Reforms 
 
3.1 Outline of the Evaluation Model 
This section evaluates the rice policy reforms described in the previous section by the 
standard welfare analysis adopted by Otsuka and Hayami (1985), Hayami and Godo (1997), 
and Godo (2002). 
The analytical framework of this paper is based on Otsuka and Hayami (1985). They 
evaluated the rice policies in Japan from 1965 to 1980 using a partial equilibrium model with 
constant elasticities. They argued that the motivation of the government in this period was to 
raise producers’ welfare while minimizing the budget costs and that it was not concerned with 
consumer welfare. They also concluded that acreage control was the second-best policy to 
reduce social inefficiency under the policy of supporting high prices for rice. Godo (2002) also 
evaluated the rice policies until 1997 using similar models and decomposed the PSE into effect 
of domestic policies and border restriction. These models set the producer and consumer prices 
of rice and the acreage control rate as exogenous variables, and the quantity of the government 
procurement is endogenously determined. 
In this paper, I also assume a supply and demand curve with a constant elasticity and that the 
market price is determined at the equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market. However, due 
to the following rice policy reforms, the models used in the previous studies cannot be directly 
applied in this paper. There are three points that are incorporated into the model. First, the 
orderly marketing system has been abolished, and the price of rice is determined by the market 
equilibrium. The government has a smaller effect than before on the supply and demand of rice 
through acreage control and maintenance of the government stock for food security. Second, 
the minimum access rice import began in 1995. Third, as a substitute for the support of the 
market price of rice under the Food Control System, a system of direct payments that enables 
rice farmers to compensate for the price fluctuation has been introduced. In order to incorporate 
these changes into the model, the direct payment per output, the acreage control rate, and the 
quantity of the government procurement are set as exogenous variables and the equilibrium 
price of rice, as an endogenous variable. The imported quantity is exogenous, because the 
import is controlled by the government. It is also assumed there is no difference in the quality 
of rice regardless of when or where it was produced. 
The structural equations of the rice market model are as follows. 
Demand function: Q   A·p  
 α                                                                                                                    (1) 
Supply function: Q   B· 1 θ   ·p  
    B· 1 θ   ·  p   g                                                     (2) 
Market equilibrium condition: Q   G Q                                                                                               (3) 
Relationship between consumer and producer price: p   m p                                                     (4) 
In the above equations, the variables represent the following. 
p : farm gate price of rice g: average subsidy per unit 
p 
 : farm gate price of rice, including subsidy 
p : retail price of rice 
m: distribution margin, defined by the gap between actual farm gate and retail price and assume 
to be constant in each year 
G: net purchase of rice by the government, namely, the purchased quantity of domestic rice less 
the released quantity of minimum access rice 
Q ,Q : supply and demand, respectively 
A, B: shift parameter of supply and demand, respectively 
θ: rate of acreage control, defined by the ratio of unplanted paddy field to cultivated paddy field 
α,β: price elasticities of supply and demand, respectively 
As per Suzuki and Kaiser (1998), the elasticities of price are obtained from a survey of related 
studies. The price elasticity of supply is set as 0.45, following the estimation of Fujiki (2000). 
This value is greater than 0.18, as in Otsuka and Hayami (1985), and approximately 0.4, as in 
Godo (2002). I use –0.335 as the price elasticity of demand, following the estimation by 
Kusakari and Kakino (1998). This price elasticity is slightly greater than –0.2, as in Godo 
(2002), and –0.12, as in Otsuka and Hayami (1985)
4. 
 
3.2 Scenarios of the Simulation 
On the basis of the abovementioned model, the effect of the rice policy reforms is evaluated 
by analyzing how the changes in each policy affect social welfare. In this model, the 
government can alter three parameters in the domestic rice policies: the acreage control rate,θ; 
direct payment per output to producers, g; and volume of net purchase by the government, G. 
In these three policy variables, acreage control is an ex ante policy that maintains the price of 
rice, while the direct payment and government’s purchase can be regarded as ex post policies 
that compensate for the price fluctuation. Therefore, I first evaluate the welfare effect of direct 
payment and the government purchase by the simulation of abolishing these two policies. Next, 
I simulate the case of abolishing the acreage and compare it with the first case. Following Godo 
(2002), the decomposition of the current PSE into the domestic policies and the border 
restriction is made from these simulations. In order to evaluate the effect of gradual policy 
reforms, simulations are conducted for the whole period under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, namely from 1995 to 2006. 
The details of each simulation are as follows. 
(a) Abolition of direct payment and government purchase 
In this simulation, the direct payment per output to producers, g, is set as zero. Since the direct 
payment is based on output, it stimulates farmers’ incentives for production. I assume that 
farmers can expect the amount of payment before production, which is realistic considering the 
payment stabilizes the price of rice to the level of the average price in the previous years. In 
addition, I also assume that the function of the government with regard to domestic rice is 
restricted to maintaining a rotating stock and that it sells all the minimum access rice for edible 
use, except when there is a demand for its processing use. I estimate the demand of minimum 
access rice for processing use from the average sales of minimum access rice, as of March 2008. 
The amount saved in government expenditure by the abolition of government purchase is 
obtained as the actual expenditure of rice procurement in each year, which is published in the 
official documents of the Japanese MAFF. The gain from selling minimum access rice is 
calculated as the farm gate price of rice obtained by the simulation less the assumed price of 
                                                  
4 The sensitive test of changing the value of elasticities is conducted. The effect of policies is larger for both 
producers and consumers when I assume smaller supply and demand elasticities. The changes in policy 
effect are 10–20 % of the original simulations when I set the values of elasticities from half to twice of the 
assumed ones; the conclusion of the simulations thus remains unchanged by the value of elasticities. rice for feed, that is, 2,000 yen per 60 kg. 
(b) Abolition of acreage control 
This scenario supposes that all the three rice policies considered in this article, namely, acreage 
control, direct payment per output, and government purchase, are abolished. The results are 
shown in Table 2 as the change from simulation (a). In this case, although the government does 
not have to grant a subsidy for acreage control, the revenue from selling minimum access rice 
for edible use decreases due to the decline in the price of rice.  
The result of each simulation is obtained as follows. First, the shift parameters of supply and 
demand are estimated from the actual data and assumed elasticities. These shift parameters 
reflect the actual fluctuation of supply and demand in each year. Next, after changing the values 
of exogenous policy variables, a new equilibrium farm gate price is calculated from the market 
equilibrium condition. Then, the retail price, which is a sum of farm gate price and actual 
distribution margin, the quantity of supply and demand, and changes of producer and consumer 
surplus are calculated from the model equations. 
 
3.3 Simulation Results 
The simulation results are shown in Table 4. 
[Table 4] 
First, from simulation (a), it is observed that the effect of the two policies on producer surplus 
is positive, except for 2003—the year of the bad harvest. The increased amount of producer 
surplus has, however, declined, especially after 1998, when the New Rice Policies was 
introduced. The effect of the two policies on consumer surplus is negative in most years, 
although the amount is not substantial since 1998. This is partly because the effect of direct 
payment is shifted not only to producers but also to consumers through increased production. 
The procurement of rice results in smaller gains to the producers each year. In the case of a bad 
harvest, as in 2003, the government sells a larger amount of rice to the domestic market than 
that it purchases, thus preventing farmers from taking advantage of the high price of rice. This 
is because of the accumulated stock of imported rice as well as the constraint on purchasing 
domestic rice since the implementation of the New Rice Policies. 
Next, the simulation results of simulation (b) are examined, in which not only direct payment 
per output and government purchase but also acreage control is abolished. The farm gate price 
of rice in simulation (a) is approximately 50–60% higher than that in simulation (b), while the 
quantity produced is 10–15% smaller. This is the effect of price support by acreage control. The 
change of producer surplus from simulation (a) to (b) is 600 billion yen, on average. The effect 
of acreage control to increase producer surplus is much larger than the effect of direct payment 
and government purchase; it is clear that the most significant transfer is made to producers by 
the acreage control program. This has especially been the case after 1998, when the New Rice 
Policies was introduced and the government purchase of rice was restricted. On the other hand, 
the acreage control policy imposes a serious burden on consumers and increases the 
government expenditure. The sum of reduced consumer surplus and government expenditure 
by the acreage control program is about 990 billion yen, on average, which is much larger than 
the increase in producer surplus. 
The estimation of PSE in each simulation is also included in Table 4. Comparing the actual 
PSE related to rice farming shown in Table 2, the extent of transfers made by import tariff and 
domestic policies is ascertained. The PSE in simulation (b), in which all the domestic policies 
related to rice farming are abolished, shows how much transfer is made by import restriction. 
Approximately half of the PSE is composed of import tariff, while acreage control plays a key 
role in supporting domestic rice price and thus increasing the PSE related to rice farming.  
[Figure 1] 
 To discuss the effect of domestic rice policies, I plot the change of producer surplus on the 
vertical line and the sum of the change of consumer surplus and the government expenditure on 
the horizontal line in Figure 1. The 45-degree line represents efficient transfer to the producer 
without deadweight loss. The sum of the transfer to producers by these three policies declined 
from 970 billion yen in 1995–1997 to 760 billion yen in 2004–2006; this is shown by the shift 
of plots in the bottom right direction. Figure 1 also shows the ATE, which is defined as the ratio 
of producer surplus change to the sum of changes in consumer surplus and government 
expenditure, and is calculated as the slope of the line between each point and the original point. 
Except for 1998 and 2003 (the years of bad harvest), the plots are approximately on the same 
line. This implies that the ATE remains constant even with the rice policy reforms. The average 
ATE during the analysis period is 0.62, which implies that 62% of the loss of consumers and 
government expenditure is transferred to producers and the remaining is forgone as dead 
weight loss. 
In order to further examine the efficiency of the acreage control program, I draw the STC of 
rice policies along with the changes in the acreage control rate from 0 to 0.5 by 0.05. The 
average statistics from 2004 to 2006 are used in this simulation. The dotted line represents the 
STC in Figure 1. As per the numerical example by Gardner (1983), the slope of the STC is less 
than one and declines as the acreage control rate rises. This implies that the inefficiency of 
acreage control becomes even more substantial as the policy is reinforced. However, the 
growing importance of the acreage control policy in the current rice policy mix is shown in 
Table 4. As argued by Alston and Hurd (1990), efficient redistribution along with the 45-degree 
line is possible by providing decoupled direct payment or by combining direct payment per 
output with production quota. Therefore, it could be concluded that the government has 
arbitrarily chosen to adopt inefficient policy mix by strengthening the acreage control policy. 
This is justified if the government is indifferent to the changes in consumer welfare and tries to 





The current AMS of the Japanese agricultural policies is well below the commitment level, 
and the prohibitive tariff rate of rice has been accepted. On the other hand, the market price 
support through acreage control and procurement continues to exist, although the distribution 
system has been liberalized. The Japanese government does not have to introduce additional 
reforms to ensure that the policies conform to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and is even 
able to grant large amount of trade-distorting direct payment to domestic producers. This raises 
a question against the ability of the WTO rules to control domestic policies, especially by 
developed countries. The quantitative analysis conducted in this study offers a basis for 
improving transparency of domestic policies by Japan and negotiating effective disciplines of 
domestic support, such as redefinition of AMS and Green Box. With regard to domestic policy 
reforms, this study clearly verified the inefficiency of current policy mix related to rice. The 
government should not only passively respond to the reforms of the domestic policies 
following the international negotiations but also ensure positive reforms in order to improve 
the efficiency of these policies. 
In the simulations, it was assumed that the market of rice is homogenous, perfectly 
competitive and closed economy. However, the assumptions of homogenous good and perfect 
competition may be oversimplified, considering the quality difference and the market structure 
of rice. In addition, the assumption of closed economy may become invalid when the 
prohibitive tariff is controlled by a tariff reduction or the import quota is expanded. It is 
necessary to modify the evaluation model to account for these limitations. References 
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